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Why consider pay at all? 
 
Pay theory: Underpinning literature 
• Marginal product theory 
‒ The owner is the entrepreneur (Penrose 1995) 
– The executive as the hired person (Roberts 1956) 
• Governance 
– Separation of ownership and control 
– Principal agent theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 1979; 
Fama 1980; Jensen and Murphy 1990) 
• Structural theory 
– Pay related to levels of hierarchy and size (Simon 1957) 
• Tournament theory 
‒ VC pay incentivises workers at all levels (Lazear & Rosen 1981; 
Rosen 1986) 
• Human capital theory 
– Pay for your skills (Liang & Weir 1999) 
– Tournament (Lazear & Rosen 1981; Ehrenberg & Bognanno 1990) 
 
Grounded in agency theory 
Who really are the 
principals?  
 
What do they really 
want the agent to 
deliver? 
 




























Here lies the conundrum... 




























delegate authority to 
manage firms to 
agents  
Methodology 
• UK higher education institutions (HEIs) over period 2010/11-2014/15 
• Salary for 154 to 158 VCs each year 
• Times Higher VC Pay Survey 
 
• Random-effects model: 
  
 
Log Annual pay = f (VC ‘performance’, institutional characteristics, HEI prestige, 
                                                                                                     VC characteristics) 
 Definition of performance: 
economist definition of 
efficiency?  





















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real VC salary 
Mean Min Max
N = 778 
N varies by year 
from 154 to 159 
Mean = £235342 
Min = £99544 
Max = 580168 
Explanatory variables 
Agency theory and performance 
‘…it is difficult to define what exactly constitutes 
‘performance’ in higher education. For example, it may be 
income generation, research/teaching quality, student 
enrolment, achieving institution goals or combinations of all 
of these. This issue becomes more acute given that 
universities are multi-product organisations…’ 
 
‘VCs face multiple principals, perform multiple tasks, and 
work as part of a team seeking to meet institutional goals 
and objectives. However, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that good financial management and furthering the 
institution’s mission should be rewarded.’  
(Bachan & Reilly 2017) 
 
Explanatory variables  
Who are the agents? 
• Government 
• Value for money – ‘efficiency’ 
• Teaching performance; research performance 
• Students (and their parents) 
• Teaching performance; NSS 
• Governing body 






PGINPUT (x1): Numbers on 
postgraduate programmes 




STAFF (x3): Number of FTE 
academic staff 
ADMIN (x5): Expenditure on 
administration including staff 
 
CapitaACSERV (x4): Expenditure 






PGOUTPUT (y1): Graduates from 
postgraduate programmes 




RESEARCH (y2): Income received in 
funding council grants plus income 
received in research grants and 
contracts 
 
Explanatory variables: performance  
DEA managerial efficiency (VRSEFF) 
Inputs 
Primary inputs: 
PGINPUT (x1): Numbers on 
postgraduate programmes 




STAFF (x3): Number of FTE 
academic staff 
ADMIN (x5): Expenditure on 
administration including staff 
 
CapitaACSERV (x4): Expenditure 






PGOUTPUT (y1): Graduates from 
postgraduate programmes 




RESEARCH (y2): Income received in 
funding council grants plus income 
received in research grants and 
contracts 
 
Explanatory variables: performance  
DEA managerial efficiency (VRSEFF) 
Explanatory variables: performance 
Financial security and media rankings 
• DEA VRS efficiency (VRSEFF) 
• Financial security index from HESA (FSI) 
• Complete University Guide overall score (OVERALL) 
 
 n mean min max 
VRSEFF 701 0.84 0.45 1.00 
FSI 780 327.05 30.00 627.00 
OVERALL 552 584.75 274.00 1000.00 
Explanatory variables: performance 
Financial security and media rankings 
Components of the Complete University Guide rankings: 
Entry scores (ENTRY); NSS score (NSS); Research quality 
(RQ); Graduate prospects (GRADPROSP); Student staff ratio 
(SSR); Academic services spend (ASS); Facilities spend (FS); 




ENTRY 552 323.49 179.00 593.00 
NSS 552 3.86 3.42 4.22 
RQ 552 2.57 0.48 6.62 
GRADPROSP 552 65.75 41.40 90.60 
SSR 552 17.57 8.90 36.70 
ASS 552 1005.08 369.01 3263.46 
FS 552 357.54 62.56 992.78 
GOODHONS 552 62.41 33.90 91.80 
COMP 552 84.24 56.00 99.00 
Explanatory variables:  
Human capital theory 
• VC age (AGE) 




• 643 (82%) male, 139 (18%) female observations 
 
 
n mean min max 
AGE 705 58.68 45 72 
Explanatory variables:  
Structural theory 
• Merger activity reflected by a dummy variable to denote 
merger (MERGER) 
• Size as reflected by total number of UG and PG 
students, divided by 1000, (SIZE) and its square 
(SIZESQ) 
 
• 220 (28%) pre-1992, 575 (72%) post-1992 observations 
• 4 (0.5%) merger, 791 (99.5%) non-merger observations 
n mean min max 
SIZE 779 12.001 169 79.064 
Explanatory variables:  
Tournament theory 
• Prestige reflected by pre-1992 or post-1992 (PRE1992) 
 
• 220 (28%) pre-1992, 575 (72%) post-1992 observations 
Results 
Performance 1 2 
VRSEFFt-1 0.22* 0.17* 
FSI 0.0026 0.0035 




















GOODHONSt-1  0.16* 
COMPTt-1  -0.14 
 
Results 
3&4: variables relating to VC characteristics included 
Performance 1 2 3 4 
VRSEFFt-1 0.22* 0.17* 0.13* 0.11* 
FSI 0.0026 0.0035 0.01 0.01 



































GOODHONSt-1  0.16* 
 
0.11 





3&4: variables relating to VC characteristics included 
5&6: as 3&4 plus variables relating to structure included 
Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 
VRSEFFt-1 0.22* 0.17* 0.13* 0.11* 0.14* 0.10* 
FSI 0.0026 0.0035 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 






























































3&4: variables relating to VC characteristics included 
5&6: as 3&4 plus variables relating to structure included 
7&8: as 5&6 plus time dummies included 
Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VRSEFFt-1 0.22* 0.17* 0.13* 0.11* 0.14* 0.10* 0.05 0.05 
FSI 0.0026 0.0035 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 

















































































1,3&5: overall university score used to measure media rankings performance 
2,4&6: separate components used to measure media rankings performance 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
AGE 
  
0.57* 0.53* 0.49* 0.44* 0.35* 0.35* 
MALE 
  
0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
Structure 
        
MERGER 
    
0.06* 0.04* 0.05* 0.03 
PRE1992 
    
0.05* 0.04 0.07* 0.05 
SIZE 
    
0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 
SIZESQ 
    
-0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* 
 
Conclusions and further work  
• Agency theory:  
-Output performance (as measure by the Complete University Guide 
overall score) is consistently a significant driver of VC pay 
-Entry score, NSS results and Academic spending are important 
components of the overall score driving pay 
-Efficiency is significant except when time dummies are included in 
the model 
-Financial security index is unrelated to VC pay 
• Human capital theory:  
-Age (experience) drives pay; gender does not 
• Structural theory:  
-Size of institution drives pay; effect of merger is significant except 
when time dummies are included 
 
